Deft political management seems to have saved the beleaguered Pakistan government, and the January 15 crisis created by a simultaneous attack by the Judiciary and the Barelvi cleric Tahir ul-Qadri, which few believe was coincidental, has diffused somewhat. As crowds thin at Jinnah Square, it would be appropriate to examine the larger purpose behind the pincer attack.
Having been close to former dictator General Pervez Musharraf, Qadri has poor democratic credentials. The suspicion that the military was behind his focused attack on the regime and political parties was reinforced by his demand for the immediate resignation of the Zardari government and dismissal of the four provincial assemblies as a prelude to electoral reforms to be enacted by a caretaker regime set up in consultation with the military and the judiciary. These include reconstituting the election commission; debarring ‘corrupt’ politicians from contesting elections, and if necessary, prolonging the duration of the caretaker regime (i.e., postponing the elections).
As this is a euphemism for a military-backed puppet regime, the Army quickly distanced itself from Qadri. Most analysts and politicians, however, were convinced that Qadri was propped up to divert public attention from the Army’s poor record in controlling domestic terrorism, fighting the Taliban, and countering separatist violence in the northwest.
Qadri denounced the idea of a neutral caretaker government to be set up by the ruling Pakistan People’s Party in consultation with the main opposition Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz party, as mandated by the 20th constitutional amendment. The two principal parties were close to deciding the timing of the next general elections. Hence Qadri’s demands were robustly opposed by Nawaz Sharif and other opposition parties.
Emboldened, the Zardari government, the first elected regime likely to complete its five-year term (in March), announced that the elections will be completed by May 15. As of now, it seems likely that the PPP-backed Zardari government will return to power in Islamabad.
Islamabad also moved to meet the twin challenge from the Judiciary and the cleric. The government strongly defended prime minister Raja Pervez Ashraf, saying that the call for his arrest was in a remark by the Chief Justice of the Pakistan Supreme Court and was not part of the court order as Ashraf has not been convicted in any corruption case involving private power stations. The allegations pertain to Ashraf’s stint as power minister in 2010.
On Thursday, Jan. 17, Fasih Bokhari, head of the anti-corruption National Accountability Bureau, told the Supreme Court there was not enough evidence to arrest the Prime Minister. The court has asked Bokhari to bring the case files back to the bench so it can see if there is incriminating evidence. This could diffuse the crisis.
This is the second political crisis created by the Judiciary. In 2012 the judiciary disqualified Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani for refusing to ask Swiss authorities to reopen corruption cases against President Zardari, which was later done by Ashraf. The judiciary was also accused of playing a role in the “memogate” affair in which the regime (via envoy Husain Haqqani) allegedly sought American intervention to avert a possible military coup.
Regarding Tahir ul-Qadri, the police issued an arrest warrant and registered a case against him and 70 unidentified persons for attacking police officials during the Jan. 15 rally in Islamabad. The charges include attempted murder, interfering in the functioning of the government, snatching weapons from the police and disturbing the peace.
Qadri, a former member of Parliament who abruptly resigned and settled in Canada for seven years (he is a dual Canadian-Pakistani national) suddenly returned to the country in December and began to critique the elected regime while lauding the Judiciary and the Army. His demand for the resignation of the Zardari government was endorsed by Tehreek-e-Insaaf leader Imran Khan, widely perceived as close to the British establishment.
Observers believe that several powerful forces inside and outside Pakistan joined hands to create the current crisis, the timing of which is pertinent. There is tension on the border in Kashmir where fresh incidents saw the death of two Indian jawans with the mutilation of both bodies and beheading of one; Qadri’s march aimed at dislodging the regime at the end of its tenure; the Chief Justice’s demand for arrest of the prime minister; continued instances of domestic terrorism including massacre of Shias in Quetta, and American President Obama’s desperate search for an “acceptable dictator” to takeover in Afghanistan and facilitate US troop withdrawal.
With the army losing prestige on account of growing internal terrorism, the gruesome incident with India is being viewed as an attempt to regain domestic stature. The Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s refusal to join Washington’s new Asia Pivot policy designed to needle China has helped the Pakistan Army vis-à-vis America.
Qadri, who heads the Tehrik-i-Minhajul Quran (TMQ), became famous by writing a fatwa condemning terrorism in 2010, though it is not the only fatwa on the subject. He is known for his TV sermons on Sufi Islam. Political parties have been cold to him as it is felt that he could not have mustered public support for his rally in the heart of Islamabad without the support of the Army. Roughly 30,000 persons attended the rally, but observers say this is far less than the one lakh reportedly present at this homecoming rally in Lahore on Dec. 23, 2012.
Questions are being asked about the huge funds Qadri seems to have access to. Given that he praises only the judiciary and the army, he seems to be ‘somebody’s man’. The US Government has denied backing or funding him. But his pre-return television advertisement campaign alone cost millions of dollars, so his funding is opaque to say the least.
Some observers feel that Qadri could be part of a Western attempt to infiltrate and gain control of the region’s large Barelvi (Sufi) community. The West is well entrenched among the Wahhabis and Deobandis, but so far the Sufis have eluded their control. This bears watching, as the plan could be to play off the various groups against each other, thus further destabilizing the region.
NitiCentral, 17 January 2013
http://www.niticentral.com/2013/01/a-fading-coloured-revolution.html
