Bangladesh foreign minister Dipu Moni, currently visiting the capital to attend a seminar, is reportedly anxious to overcome the inhibitions of opposition parties regarding the India-Bangladesh Land Protocol, implementation of which has been stalled despite being signed in 2011. Military veterans and strategic thinkers like former Army Chief Gen. Shankar Roy Choudhary and Maj Gen (retd) GD Bakshi have repeatedly stated that India has a stake in a friendly government in Dhaka, and that in an election year a tunnel vision by India’s elected representatives could be harmful in the long term. This view is endorsed by serving Army officers who say that the concessions being offered by India are negligible.
Given the emotions roused over the deal, it may be expedient to examine its contours. In February 2013, the Union Cabinet approved the draft of The Constitution (119th Amendment) Bill, 2013, to amend the First Schedule of the Indian Constitution (pertaining to the territory of India) in accordance with the India-Bangladesh boundary agreement 1974.
Additional protocols for this agreement were signed during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Dhaka in September 2011. The Prime Minister was accompanied by the Chief Ministers of Assam, Tripura, Meghalaya and Mizoram, but the West Bengal chief minister backed out at the last minute.
Though Bangladesh ratified the pact, India failed to do so owing to opposition from some parties which wanted survey maps and a comprehensive discussion in Parliament first. The constitutional amendment involving territorial exchange requires a two-thirds majority in both Houses of Parliament.
The Protocol to the 1974 Land Boundary Agreement involved demarcation of the un-demarcated boundary of approximately 6.1 km by maintaining status quo and demarcating the three sections of the boundary as mutually agreed during the Joint Border Working Group. This involved 111 Indian enclaves in Bangladesh (17,149 acres, 69.45 sq km) and 51 Bangladesh enclaves in India (7110 acres, 28.77 sq km) to be retained by each side, with India relinquishing claim to additional land as compensation of loss.
This involves a loss of 40.68 sq km of land in the State of West Bengal. Till the exchange of enclaves is completed, the Teen Bigha Corridor will be open twenty four hours for Bangladesh. Both sides would retain Adverse Possession Lands (APLs) and maintain status quo. India would retain 2.13 sq km of land and lose claim to 9.12 sq km held by Bangladesh.
Official sources said that the advantage of the Protocol was a demarcated boundary, though India overall relinquished claim to 35.74 sq km. The deal is favoured in army and diplomatic circles because the Protocol is within the framework of 1974 Indira-Mujib Land Border Agreement; it maintains the status quo and demarcation of the boundary as mutually agreed by the Joint Border Survey Group.
However, the deal suffered because both Governments failed to take opposition parties on board while formulating the agreement/protocol. The Indian Government, in fact, even failed to seek the concurrence of the affected State Governments while negotiating and finalising the agreement, which heightened emotions in West Bengal and Assam and resulted in a deadlock.
The Assam Gana Parishad (AGP) and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) objected to ceding APL of Kalabari/Boroibari (Dhubri) and Pallathal (Karimganj), an area of 1.02 sq km, as it has been with India since independence. Politically, Dhubri district is predominantly populated by native Assamese, and in view of the ceaseless demographic aggression from Bangladesh, this is an emotive and political issue. The BJP was not overtly hostile to the deal, but agreed to the AGP request to support it on the issue.
What has complicated matters, however, is that the UPA tried to combine the exchange of enclaves with Teesta water sharing, wherein India will reputedly lose 13,000 acres of land, as against 3,000 acres by India. Party president Rajnath Singh objected to the Government refusing to answer questions relating to the loss of 10,000 acres of land, and failing to address the sensitive issue of Bangladeshi infiltration. Singh pointed out that as per the Group of Ministers (GoM) Report on reforming security system (2001), 1.5 crore Bangladeshis were already in India and the numbers swelled daily, with Bangladeshis spreading from Bengal and Assam to Tripura, Meghalaya and Arunachal Pradesh, endangering the stability of the north east.
In November 2011, when Dipu Moni visited Kolkata after the West Bengal Chief Minister refused to accompany the Prime Minister to Dhaka, Mamata Banerjee announced “The people of Bangladesh want Teesta water. It is their long-standing demand. We appreciate their demand. We will be glad if water can be shared”. At the same time, West Bengal informed the Centre that there was water shortage in the Teesta Barrage Project, as a result of which North Bengal did not get adequate water during the lean season.
The issue is now hanging fire, as the international river waters expert, Kalyan Rudra, who was asked to study the issue by the State Government, feels the Teesta cannot meet the unrealistic irrigation command area envisaged by the Indo-Bangla Teesta Treaty. The Teesta originates in Sikkim and flows 72 km downstream thorough Jalpaiguri and Cooch Behar in north Bengal; the Central Water Commission said it would irrigate 9.22 lakh hectares in Bengal and 7 lakh hectares in Bangladesh. But the river has enough water to irrigate only 40,000 hectares of land in Bengal. And once the 23 hydel-power projects start operating by 2013-end, the flow of water would decline further and affect irrigation downstream, not to mention the damage to the river biodiversity, water table and ecological flow.
India’s Ganga-Farakka Treaty with Bangladesh in 1996 was based on a proportionate water-sharing table of a 10-day cycle for the period Jan 1 to May 31, taking the preceding 40 years’ average into consideration. Then Prime Minister Deve Gowda signed the treaty with then Prime minister Sheikh Hasina only after the viability report was cleared. Mamata Banerjee favours preparation of a similar table based on the availability of Teesta water throughout the year and a study of the life of the people dependent on the river, and the impact of water denial.
Clearly there is no need to link the land and water issues; both should be tackled separately. At present, what matters is now India can positively impact the standing of the Awami League in Bangladesh.
Niticentral.com, 26 July 2013