Sixteen years after the 1984 anti-Sikh pogrom, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) Government set up a Commission in May 2000, under retired Supreme Court judge, Justice GT Nanavati, to probe the violence in the wake of the Sikh community’s unhappiness with previous probes by various committees as well as the Commission headed by Justice Ranganath Mishra, then the Chief Justice of India. The Mishra Commission had concluded that the rioting was a spontaneous reaction to the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.
Though the Nanavati Commission exonerated Rajiv Gandhi and many senior Congress-I members of complicity in the violence, it found evidence to indicate the involvement of Jagdish Tytler, Sajjan Kumar, and many local Congress leaders and workers, as well as unacceptable passivity on the part of the police in several places. It recommended further investigations into the role of these Congress leaders and action, as necessary.
It noted that in most cases, action against policemen and officers could not be recommended as they had by then been exonerated in departmental enquiries. Many accused had died in the interim period; some policemen and officers were simply untraceable, and the lapse of time made further action difficult in many cases because proper FIRs had not been filed at the time. Overall, there was a colossal failure of the law and order machinery, for which the then Police Commissioner SC Tandon was held responsible by the Commission.
Jagdish Tytler and Sajjan Kumar are central to the continuing angst of the Sikh community on the issue of the riots. The Nanavati Commission did a thorough job of investigating the riots, particularly in Delhi where it went district by district over the major incidents, and also police station by police station. Witnesses who furnished affidavits were duly examined and ample opportunity given to the accused politicians and police personnel to study the charges against themselves and prepare their defence. But there was no follow up action on the Nanavati Commission report because by the time it submitted its report in February 2005, the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance was in office.
The Commission received several thousand affidavits from all over the country; the main parties involved included the Delhi Sikh Gurudwara Management Committee, November 1984 Carnage Justice Committee, Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD) which were permitted to appear as representative bodies of the riot victims; the Delhi Riots Victims Association, the Government of the National Capital Territory of Delhi and Delhi Police. The Government of India submitted over 3000 affidavits filed before Justice Mishra Commission which purported to show that some Sikhs had distributed sweets after Indira Gandhi’s assassination and some had committed acts which provoked the attacks and that Congress leaders like HKL Bhagat, Jagdish Tytler, Sajjan Kumar, Dharam Das Shastri and party workers were not responsible for those acts. Other affidavits gave other versions of the attacks.
A salient finding of the Nanavati Commission validated previous conclusions of the forum headed by Justice VM Tarkunde that the mobs were organised and would often retreat after gathering outside Sikh homes or establishments when the (Hindu) neighbours intervened, but would return later and loot or burn the shops and residences. It recorded the brutality of the killings, the ineffective attempts of the Sikhs to defend themselves, and the role of the police in disarming Sikhs who were threatened with attack, thus making it easier for their assailants to return to complete the mayhem after neighbours or police had left.
Overall in New Delhi District, the Commission concluded that there was a clear involvement of Congress (I) workers in the incidents and that the policemen on duty at some places in this area watched the violent incidents as spectators and did not perform their duty of preventing the mobs from doing so. In Central District, the Commission felt that there was credible evidence against Dharam Das Shastri (now deceased) who instigated his men Tek Chand Sharma and Rajinder Singh to organize attacks on Sikhs. It recommended that the Government examine the relevant material and direct investigation or further investigation with respect to the allegations made against him.
In North District, Nanavati Commission noted that soon after the riots, a Citizens Commission headed by Justice Sikri was told by witnesses about the role of HKL Bhagat, Sajjan Kumar and Jagdish Tytler in the anti-Sikh pogrom. It found credible evidence that Jagdish Tytler had a hand in organizing attacks on Sikhs and recommended that the Government look into this aspect and take further action as necessary. In South District, the Commission found credible material against Sajjan Kumar and Balwan Khokhar and recommended that the Government re-examine the cases where witnesses accused Sajjan Kumar specifically and no charge-sheets were filed against him and the cases were terminated as untraced (it listed several such cases). In East District, the Commission concluded that there was credible material against several Congress leaders and workers accused by witnesses, but many had already been acquitted in the criminal cases filed against them, so no further action was recommended against them or HKL Bhagat in view of his physical and mental condition (now deceased).
The Nanavati Commission noted that though there were stray acts of violence against Sikhs on October 31, this violence was mainly in the nature of beating by hand and not organised with weapons like lathis or incendiary materials. This changed from the morning of November 1, in both nature and intensity. Rumours were circulated with a view to incite people against the Sikhs and prompt them to take revenge.
The Nanavati Commission noted that there “is also evidence on record to show that on October 31, 1984, either meetings were held or the persons who could organize attacks were contacted and were given instructions to kill Sikhs and loot their houses and shops. The attacks were made in a systematic manner and without much fear of the police; almost suggesting that they were assured that they would not be harmed while committing those acts and even thereafter. Male members of the Sikh community were taken out of their houses. They were beaten first and then burnt alive in a systematic manner. In some cases tyres were put around their necks and then they were set on fire by pouring kerosene or petrol over them. In some cases white inflammable powder was thrown on them which immediately caught fire thereafter”.
This, the Commission observed, was the common pattern followed by the big mobs which played havoc in certain areas. The shops were identified, looted and burnt; it “became an organized carnage”. It concluded that, “But for the backing and help of influential and resourceful persons, killing of Sikhs so swiftly and in large numbers could not have happened”. Though some mobs included local people from jhuggi clusters, in many places the mobs comprised of outsiders, which “required an organised effort”, and “supplying them with weapons and inflammable material also required an organized effort”.
The Commission noted, “There is evidence to show that outsiders were shown the houses of the Sikhs… There is also evidence to show that in a systematic manner the Sikhs who were found to have collected either at gurudwara or at some place in their localities for collectively defending themselves were either persuaded or forced to go inside of their houses. There is enough material on record to show that at many places the Police had taken away their arms or other articles with which they could have defended themselves against the attacks by mobs… All this could not have happened if it was merely a spontaneous reaction of the angry public”.
In a blistering indictment of the then ruling Congress (I), the Commission noted that besides Congress (I) leaders and workers, no other persons or organizations were alleged to have taken part in the incidents. It agreed with the Justice Mishra Commission that there was a delay in calling the Army, and observed that to ensure that such events never happened again, the police force must be independent of political influence so as to take effective action.
Niticentral.com, 1 February 2014